by Matteo G. Crow
On April 24, 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order (EO) intended to boost the deep-sea mining industry and to address “unprecedented economic and national security challenges in securing reliable supplies of critical minerals independent of foreign adversary control.” Historically, China has accounted for a majority of all global critical mineral production. Unfortunately, like many of the Trump administration’s decoupling efforts (like ricocheting tariffs), waving the executive order wand to create a domestic industry, particularly one heavily reliant on expensive and relatively emerging technology, may be insufficient to jumpstart the industry in the time frame it envisions.
A four-year presidential term may feel like forever, but in the realm of technological innovation and industry, it can barely be enough to get a project started. For instance, the first offshore wind farm was installed in 1991 off the coast of Denmark, but as of 2025 not a single offshore wind turbine has been built off the American west coast for reasons beyond political apathy.
Let’s get into it – what was the state of deep-sea mining before this executive order?
Deep-sea mining constitutes the activities necessary to “retrieve valuable mineral deposits found on the ocean’s floor, hundreds or even thousands of meters below its surface.” Deep-sea mining outside of each country’s national waters is regulated by the International Seabed Authority (the Authority), an intergovernmental organization established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States is not a member of UNCLOS, although the Authority claims a membership of 169 countries plus the European Union.
The Authority is tasked with regulating both the exploration and active deep-sea mining through its “Mining Code.” While the Authority has exercised its authority to issue exploration permits in numerous instances, it has yet to finalize, much less adopt, regulations governing the actual mining of deep-sea minerals. Delays stem primarily from the international community’s hesitancy around the potentially detrimental ecological impacts and the logistical challenges of preventing a winner-takes-all regime.
Meanwhile, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and, to lesser extent, the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), regulates deep-seabed mining within U.S. domestic waters (the Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ). After NOAA conducted a successful environmental impact assessment in the 1970s, Congress passed the first comprehensive regulation of deep-sea mining with the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA). NOAA subsequently promulgated implementing regulations and adopted them in 1989, working somewhat in parallel with the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 and subsequent establishment of the Authority.
Did either of these efforts spur widespread deep-sea mining? Not quite. Despite the vast mineral potential in the deep seabed, as of 2025, only one company is actively establishing a deep-sea mining operation, seeking permitting approval from NOAA under the regulations adopted under the DSHMRA.
Given the United State’s current pro-resource development political climate, it would seem prudent for companies to jump at the opportunity to engage in deep-sea mining. Even if future U.S. administrations disagree with the Trump administration’s approach, parties across the political spectrum recognize America’s vulnerability to its reliance on the Chinese critical mineral supply chains. But, significant risk factors inhibit immediate widespread investment in deep-sea mining.
The first challenge is physical – according to the World Resources Institute, “the bulk of the most attractive mineral deposits are found on vast seafloor abyssal plains in international waters.” These aren’t the 40-foot waters off the coast of Virginia where offshore wind farms can be built with relative ease (at least compared to their West Coast counterparts). The particularly valuable polymetallic nodules, which are concentrated areas of critical minerals, are generally located between 13,000 and 20,000 ft. Conditions are dark, cold, and under high pressure.
Moreover, a primary deep-sea mining technique, dragging the sea floor, can create turbidity that exacerbates the already poor visibility. Operating at such depths requires specialized equipment that can function under these intense conditions, operate remotely, and that has the durability to function under these intense environmental conditions for extended periods of time. Equipment like that does not come cheap and the absence of an existing deep sea mining industry makes most equipment relatively untested in on-the-ground applications.
Once companies overcome these technological barriers they will have to account for a complex political environment. After minerals are extracted, companies must get these critical minerals back to domestic processing facilities. To be fair, the international mining community has considerable experience operating in difficult environments. But operating in the deep seabed creates a whole new tangle of security and logistical hurdles. Namely, because most of the valuable resource spots are in international waters.
Since at least World War II, the U.S. Navy has facilitated the expansion of a globally interconnected economic system built on safe and navigable maritime trade routes. This system is concerningly fragile, as exhibited by shipping transit through the Suez Canal having dropped by over 50% in the past year in response to regional conflict. If deep-sea mining investment snowballs and the United States leads the way in encouraging and permitting these projects, it is not hard to imagine other countries foregoing their environmental concerns in the name of national security.
That could result in what is arguably the first large-scale global development industry operating predominantly in international waters; and with it, the associated burden on the U.S. Navy and other actors to prevent conflict and shepherd these expensive technologies and resources through international waters. Widespread “theft” of marine resources in the global fishing economy has already demonstrated the difficulty of governing the high seas in a context with considerably lower stakes. We suspect the Authority as it exists today would be insufficient to enforce a legal regime with any actual teeth, even were the United States to join UNCLOS, an unlikely proposition at a time when the country is isolating itself from the international order. Thus, U.S. companies would likely look to the United State’s own security apparatus to secure their operations from foreign threats.
Hopefully, we’re overestimating these barriers. The United State’s dependency on foreign (and particularly Chinese) mineral supply chains is a serious vulnerability in national security, and federal support will no doubt shift the risk balance. Perhaps more importantly, the potential rewards for first movers are considerable.
Matteo Crow is an associate at Stoel Rives LLP with experience in land use issues related to special use zoning and new Oregon extended producer responsibility laws. He can be reached at [email protected].